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The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation
Richard A. Posner*
Contract interpretation is an understudied topic in the economic analysis of contract
law. This Article combines simple formal analysis of the tradeoffs involved in interpretation
with applications to the principal doctrines of contract interpretation, including the 'four
corners" rule, mutual mistake, contra proferentum, and what I call the (informal but very
important) rule of "extrinsic nonevidence." Gapfilling is distinguished, and the relativity of
interpretive doctrines to the interpretive medium-jurors,arbitrators,andjudges in different
kinds ofjudicialsystems-is emphasized.

I.

Introduction

There is now a large economic literature on contracts and contract law,
but the interpretation of contracts, as distinct from issues involving
formation, defenses, validity, and remedies, has been rather neglected. Not
entirely so;' but the economic literature on contract interpretation has an
abstract cast, evincing only limited interest in the relevant legal doctrines. 2
Interpretation might seem an activity remote from economics-a subject
for cognitive psychologists, epistemologists, students of linguistics, legal
doctrinalists, perhaps even literary critics, rather than for economically
minded lawyers-but I shall try to show that economics can be of
considerable help in understanding the problems involved in interpreting
contracts.
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Senior Lecturer, the University of
Chicago Law School. I thank Lindsey Briggs, Rob Kenedy, Paul Ma, and Meghan Maloney for
their excellent research assistance and Douglas Baird, Lucian Bebchuk, Elizabeth Chorvat, Mitu
Gulati, Scott Hemphill, Claire Hill, Louis Kaplow, William Landes, John Langbein, Jeffrey
Lipshaw, Richard Porter, Eric Posner, Erich Schanze, Alan Schwartz, and participants in the
Columbia, Georgetown, and Harvard law and economics workshops for many stimulating
comments.
1. For notable recent examples with many references to the previous literature, see STEVEN
SHAVELL, ON THE WRITING AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10094, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/10094 (last
visited Jan. 11, 2005); Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of
Writing Contracts,92 AM. ECON. REV. 798 (2002).
2. Among the principal exceptions are Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and
Substance in Contract Interpretation,104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004); Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 568-94 (2003); George
M. Cohen, Implied Terms and Interpretationin Contract Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 78 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000); Omri Ben-Shahar, The
Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781 (1999); Eric A.
Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the
Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994); Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981). Cf David Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation,89 MICH. L. REV. 1815
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1581 2004-2005
(1991).
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Contract interpretation is the undertaking by a judge or jury (or an
arbitrator-more on arbitration later) to figure out what the terms of a
contract are, or should be understood to be.3 It should be distinguished from
simple enforcement. The most important function of contract law is to
provide a legal remedy for breach in order to enhance the utility of
contracting as a method of organizing economic activity, 4 and that function is
independent of whether there is any uncertainty about the meaning of terms.
The defendant may challenge the plaintiffs interpretation of the contract
rather than acknowledge the breach, but unless there is a real uncertainty
about meaning, the challenge will present no interesting question of
interpretation.
Still, significant interpretive questions often arise in contract litigation.
The obvious but not the only reason, besides clumsiness in the use of words,
against which the legal linguists warn us, 5 is that contractual performance
generally occurs over time rather than being complete at the instant the
contract is signed. This is a central rather than an accidental feature of the
institution of contract. Were exchange simultaneous and limited to goods the
quality of which was obvious on inspection, so that there was no danger of
unwanted surprises, there would be little need either for contracts or for legal
remedies for breach of contract. The main purpose of contracts is to enable
performance to unfold over time without either party being at the mercy of
the other, as would be the case if, for example, a buyer could refuse to pay
for a custom-built house for which there were no alternative buyers at or
above the agreed price. So contracts regulate the future, and interpretive
problems are bound to arise simply because the future is unpredictable.6
Stated otherwise, perfect foresight is infinitely costly, so that, as the
economic literature on contract interpretation emphasizes, the costs of
foreseeing and providing for every possible contingency that may affect the
costs of performance to either party over the life of the contract are
7
prohibitive.
3. The standard treatise discussion is 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
ch. 7 (3d ed. 2004).
4. See, e.g., Thomas Cooley et al., Aggregate Consequences of Limited ContractEnforceability,
112 J. POL. ECON. 818 (2004) (discussing how the enforceability of contracts attracts external
financing thus promoting economic activity of firms). This is not to deny the importance of
reputation, reciprocity, and other factors in inducing compliance with contractual undertakings. I
discuss the significance of reputation for interpretation later in the Article.
5. See, e.g., CARL FELSENFELD & ALAN SIEGEL, WRITING CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENGLISH

(1981).
6. Hence contracts tend to be more detailed the longer their duration. Karen Eggleston et al.,
The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 126
n.101 (2000).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 96 (6th ed. 2003) ("The less
frequent an event is, the less likely it is that the parties thought about it, their neglect being a
rational response to the costs of information relative to the benefits."); Jean Tirole, Incomplete
-- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1582
Contracts: Where Do We HeinOnline
Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA
741, 2004-2005
771-72 (1999) (concluding that parties
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Even in a setting of perfect foresight, an interpretive problem may arise.
Parties may rationally decide not to provide for a contingency, preferring to
economize on negotiation costs by delegating completion of the contract to
the courts should the contingency materialize. This is especially likely if
they think there is only a slight probability that the contingency will
materialize. But even if they think the probability significant, they may
prefer not to provide for the contingency. Deliberate ambiguity may be a
necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be unable to
agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances on being able to
resolve them, with or without judicial intervention, should the need arise. It
is a form of compromise like "agreeing to disagree."
The goal of a system, methodology, or doctrine of contract
interpretation is to minimize transaction costs, broadly understood as
obstacles to efforts voluntarily to shift resources to their most valuable use.
Those costs can be very great when, by inducing parties not to contract, they
prevent resources from being allocated efficiently. Because methods of
reducing contractual transaction costs, such as litigation, are themselves
costly, careful tradeoffs are required. But it would be a mistake for courts to
take the position that any ambiguity in a contract must be the product of a
culpable mistake by one or both of the parties-that the judicial function in
contract law is to punish parties who do not make their agreement clear.
Sometimes it is, as my later example will show, but more often it is not.
Contract interpretation is, of course, a judicial staple, so I have a
professional as well as an academic interest in the subject. I want this Article
to be intelligible to judges and practicing lawyers as well as to academics,
and so I want to avoid formal analysis. But a simple equation may help to
frame the analysis for some readers.
Let C be the social transaction costs of a contract ("social" in the sense
of including costs to third parties, such as the courts and future transacting
parties, as distinct from just the costs to the parties to the particular contract).
Then
C =x +p(x)[y + z + e(x,y, z)],

(1)

where x is the negotiation and drafting cost, p the probability of litigation, y
the parties' litigation costs, z the cost of litigation to the judiciary, and e
judicial error costs that reduce both the private and social value of contracts
as a method of allocating resources. The first term on the right-hand side of
the equation, x, represents the first stage in determining the meaning of the
contract, the stage at which the parties decide what the contract shall say.
The second term represents the second stage, where in the event of a legal
to a contract, due to the lack of infinite foresight, cannot contract around all contingencies because
doing so would be cost prohibitive).
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1583 2004-2005
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dispute over meaning the matter is submitted to adjudication. The costs
thereby incurred include expenditures by the parties and the courts, plus the
costs that will result if the court misinterprets the contract. The likelihood
and consequences of judicial error are influenced by the parties' and the
court's investment in the litigation but also by the parties' investment in
making the contract as clear as possible, which will facilitate an accurate and
expeditious judicial decision should a dispute over the contract's meaning
arise and be brought to court. All the costs in the second stage must be
discounted, that is multiplied, by the probability of a legal dispute, which is
lower the more the parties invested at the first stage to make the contract as
clear as possible; that is, p is declining in x. The more contingencies the
parties resolve at the drafting stage, the smaller the set of unresolved
contingencies that might give rise to a legal dispute.
The object of judicial enforcement of contracts is to minimize the sum
of these two types or stages of costs, the drafting-stage costs and the
litigation-stage costs, rather than, as might seem tempting, to insist that
parties do whatever is necessary at the first stage to minimize the likelihood
of litigation. The "do whatever is necessary" position is the effect and
perhaps purpose of formalist (in the sense of textualist) interpretation. By
refusing to make use of all available information to interpret an unclear
contract, formalist interpretation induces contracting parties to increase x,
with the effect of reducing p. An increase in x is a real cost, and it may
outweigh the savings in expected litigation costs from the reduction in the
probability, and therefore expected cost, of litigation.
The interrelations among the variables are more complex than I have
indicated, but the additional complexities are deferred to the last Part of the
Article.
II.

Gap Filling Versus Disambiguating

Persons contemplating a transaction can reduce the potential error costs
arising from imperfect foresight by shortening the duration of their contract
(consider employment at will, or spot markets), since the near future is more
predictable than the distant future. Similarly, they can agree on just a few
things and leave the rest for a future negotiation by "agreeing to agree."
Another alternative is the substitution of vertical integration for
contracting-a producer might choose for example to make rather than buy
an input, though really this would just be substituting employment for output
contracts, plus contracts to buy whatever physical materials would be used in
manufacturing the input in house, for a contract to buy the input.
A fourth alternative, which has received a good deal of attention from
economic analysts of contract law, is for a court or an arbitrator to fill any
gap in the contract when and if it emerges in the course of a dispute between
the parties. For example, a contract that gives the dealer an exclusive right to
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1584 2004-2005
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distribute the supplier's product, as by granting him an exclusive territory, is
presumed to require the dealer to devote his "best efforts" to promoting the
supplier's product.8 The theory is that otherwise the supplier would have
delivered himself into the dealer's power, which he would not be likely to do.
So if a dispute arises as to the dealer's obligations under the contract, the
court will interpolate a best-efforts clause unless the parties specified in the
contract that the dealer would not have a best-efforts obligation. Similarly,
although it is common for contracts to contain a force majeure clause, a court
will, in the name of impossibility, impracticability, or frustration, read into a
contract an implied excuse based on these common law doctrines, unless the
contract rejects the excuse. As it can; a promise to perform even if performance proves impossible for reasons wholly beyond the promisor's control is
not a contradiction in terms, but merely an undertaking that contains an
insurance component.
Judicial or arbitral gap filling is similar to the use of form contracts to
economize on contracting costs. The forms contain standard clauses
designed to resolve contingencies that may arise in the course of
performance. Like the gap-filling doctrines, these clauses are guesses as to
what the parties probably would have provided for explicitly had they written
a more complete contract. The difference is that form contracts used in
transactions with consumers tend to be one-sided because they are drafted by
firms, trade associations, or professional associations, which want such
contracts to be slanted in their favor. Standard clauses that evolve in
litigation or arbitration, and thus are created or approved by an impartial third
party, are more likely to be neutral.
To my suggestion that form contracts used in consumer transactions
tend to be one-sided it may be objected that competition can be relied upon
to yield the optimal form. But that is doubtful. Hidden traps in the language
of a contract are sprung only on the rare occasion in which there is a legal
dispute. The expected benefit of a "good" form to the consumer is therefore9
slight and so is unlikely to figure in his decision to buy the seller's product,
while the seller, having much better knowledge of the likelihood and
consequences of such a dispute, will anticipate a small gain from imposing a
"bad" form on his customers. In principle, other sellers could outcompete
him by offering better forms to consumers. But the practice is likely to be
different. The benefits of the "good" form to the consumer are unlikely to be
great enough to overcome the information costs of explaining those benefits
so that they are a selling point. More important, being reminded of the
possibility of litigation is a downer for the prospective consumer; few
consumers would want to hear "Don't worry; if I sue you, the contract will
8. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
9. Michael 1. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract:Law and Economics Meets the
599 (1990).
Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583,
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1585 2004-2005
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protect you." The seller who reminds consumers of possible legal grief down
the road is fouling his own nest.
There is a further point.t0 So far as holding a contract party to his
contractual undertaking is concerned, there is an asymmetry between seller
and buyer in cases in which the latter is a consumer rather than another
business. The seller is constrained from breaking the contract both by
considerations of reputation and by the threat of being sued;" the consumer
may well be subject to neither constraint as a practical matter, because he has
no commercial reputation to lose and, depending on the value of his
purchase, is probably not worth suing. Slanting the terms of the contract in
favor of the seller is a way of redressing the balance. A related point is that
one reason sellers will not negotiate with consumers over changes to a form
contract, besides the cost of the negotiation relative to the small stakes in an
individual consumer sale, may be that the consumer who asks to negotiate
signals to the seller that he may be litigious, or otherwise a troublemaker.
Form contracts, for example in the insurance industry, are common even
between businesses, as distinct from consumer transactions. This may reflect
in part simply a reluctance to alter terms that may have acquired a settled
meaning through litigation. More on this later when I discuss issues of
interpretation.
Another method of gap filling, found in civil code nations, such as
Germany and other nations of Continental Europe, is for the legislature to
enact a detailed code of contractual obligations, constituting implied terms
that the parties can, however, negate. Contracts are shorter and interpretive
issues minimized because the code provisions presumably will have been
clearly drafted and received a uniform interpretation.12
Filling potential gaps in contracts should be distinguished from
disambiguating specific terms, which is the heart of the problem of contract
interpretation. A contract might contain an explicit best-efforts clause, yet
the wording of the clause might leave a doubt as to what exactly it required
Gap filling and disambiguating are both, however,
of the dealer.
"interpretive" in the sense that they are efforts to determine how the parties
would have resolved the issue that has arisen had they foreseen it when they
negotiated their contract.
I noted in reference to civil code nations that gap filling reduces
interpretive uncertainty to the extent that the interpolated clauses will have
acquired a settled, uniform meaning as a result of having been interpreted in
cases. This is one reason for insurance companies' well-known reluctance to
10. Which I owe to Lucian Bebchuk.
11. Perhaps especially the former. Sidney W. DeLong, Placid,Clear-Seeming Words: Some
Realism About the New Formalism (with ParticularReference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 13, 32 (2001).
12. For evidence, see Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as
Much with Fewer Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889, 912-15 (2004).
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1586 2004-2005
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alter policy language once it has been interpreted by a court. But the other
side of this coin is that the incorporation of "boilerplate" from earlier
contracts in a new one may generate its own interpretive problems. A clause
transposed to a new context may make an imperfect fit with the other clauses
in the contract, generating ambiguity-which explains why litigation over
the meaning of insurance contracts is quite common. The fit can be improved by modifying the clause, but then the benefit of using language that
has been given a settled meaning by judicial interpretation is lost.
The tradeoff between "off the rack" and "custom-designed" contractual
language resembles that between legal rules and standards. A rule is clear by
virtue of being exact. But its exactness makes it maladapted to unforeseen
situations, creating pressure for recognizing exceptions, which will often
reduce clarity. A standard is flexible and therefore adaptable to a variety of
contexts, but the price of flexibility is vagueness.
The tradeoffs in deciding whether to create a gap filler have been
recognized for a long time. 13 The benefits are savings in contractual
transaction costs. Instead of parties to dealership contracts having to insert a
best-efforts clause in every contract, the court interpolates such a clause in
just the tiny fraction of contracts that are drawn into litigation in which an
issue concerning the adequacy of the dealer's efforts arises. The costs of
judicial gap filling are the error and administrative costs of judicial
intervention. Those costs can be prohibitive, and then the court will refuse to
fill the gap, as in the common law's refusal to enforce a contract that lacks a
price or quantity term. 14 The alternative of interpolating a "reasonable price"
or "reasonable quantity" clause is rejected because a court would find it too
burdensome to figure out what price or quantity the parties would have
chosen had they negotiated the term. Not only would the court incur the
administrative cost of having to conduct an elaborate inquiry, but no matter
how elaborate the inquiry, a substantial probability of error would remain,
and an erroneous interpretation undermines the utility of contracting as a
method of organizing economic activity.
13.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 44 (1973).

14. See, e.g., Echols v. Pelullo, 377 F.3d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 2004); Tranzact Techs., Ltd. v.
Evergreen Partners, Ltd., 366 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2004); Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d
289, 292 (7th Cir. 2002); Interstate Litho Corp. v. Brown, 255 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2001). It is true
that under the Uniform Commercial Code, as distinct from the common law, contracts for the sale
of goods are enforceable even when they fail to specify a price; courts are to fill the gap by inserting
a reasonable market price. U.C.C. § 2-305 (2003); see also Koch Hydrocarbon Co. v. MIDU Res.
Group, 988 F.2d 1529, 1534 (8th Cir. 1993); Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc., 984 P.2d 697, 700
Since there is usually a readily ascertainable market price for goods, the
(Idaho 1999).
administrative and error costs that courts incur in filling in the price are generally manageable.
Note too that when a contract is held to be unenforceable for want of an adequate specification of
price, but the performing party has performed in good faith, he will usually be allowed to claim the
market value of his performance in a suit for restitution. In such a case the court is, in effect,
"pricing" the contract. See, e.g., Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (N.Y.

1983).

HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1587 2004-2005
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Nor would the cost savings be significant. Normally it is only through
inadvertence that the parties will have failed to negotiate price or quantity,
and in those cases judicial interpolation of the missing term would not reduce
overall contractual transaction costs. On the contrary, it would increase
them. The costs of judicial gap filling in such a case would exceed the costs
to the parties of filling the gap at the contract-negotiation stage; that is
implied by the parties' having inadvertently omitted the term. Also, the
absence of such a term is often compelling evidence that the parties'
negotiations had not reached the stage of actual agreement. In that event,
judicial interpolation of terms would amount to the court making a contract
for the parties rather than enforcing something that could properly be
regarded as the deal they had struck.
It might seem that the courts would never have good information for
deciding what gap-filling rules would be optimal. But there are three reasons
to think this view too pessimistic. The first is that even if for philosophical,
political, or other reasons the goal of contract law is taken to be the enforcement of the parties' intended transaction whether or not it is a valuemaximizing one, the norm of economic efficiency provides a guide to
deciding what transaction was, in all likelihood, intended. Each party wants
to maximize his gain from the transaction, and that is usually best done by
agreeing to terms that maximize the surplus created by the transaction-the
excess of benefits over costs, the excess being divided between the parties.
Of course, each party will be concerned not with the total surplus as such, but
only with the absolute size of his share of it. But he will be more likely (no
stronger prediction is possible, for reasons explained later) to maximize his
share if there is enough surplus for the other party to do well also. Hence
gap-filling rules based on notions of efficiency will tend to mimic the terms
that the parties would have incorporated into their contract explicitly had
they foreseen the gap and been unwilling to rely on the courts to fill it
sensibly.
The second reason not to worry too much about courts' adopting
inefficient gap-filling rules is that they can obtain those rules from the
practices of the industry or trade in which the contract was made; they don't
have to derive them from first principles. Historically, Anglo-American
contract law derived from the law merchant, the set of customary norms
created by businessmen; such norms would carry a presumption of
efficiency.
And third, since the judicial gap-filling contract rules are only gap
fillers, the parties can negate such a rule by expressly rejecting it in their
contract. In other words, unlike many other legal rules, gap-filling rules for
contract cases are subject to the discipline of the market. The argument that
parties to dealership agreements might not want a best-efforts obligation to
be read into their agreement because the possibility of having to litigate over
its meaning might exceed its benefits is thus superficial. They can exclude
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1588 2004-2005
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judicial interpolation of such an obligation by stating in the contract that the
dealer is not legally obligated to use his best efforts to promote the supplier's
product.
But how will courts discover that a particular gap-filling rule is being
negated in a large percentage of the contracts to which it applies? The
contracts that are drawn into litigation are not necessarily a representative
sample of all contracts. Nor is an individual judge likely to have had enough
contract cases to be able to make an estimate of the percentage of a given
class of contracts that rejects a particular gap filler-especially since a
negated gap filler is unlikely to figure in litigation. But this need not be a
decisive objection to judicial reconsideration of gap-filling rules. Academics
can conduct the necessary inquiry into the negation rate, and a litigant who
failed to negate such a rule in his contract, is being sued over it, and must
now ask the court to abrogate it will have an incentive to inform the court of
the results of the inquiry, though depending on the results, it may be the
opposing party who has the incentive to inform the court of them.
III. Methods of Disambiguating Contracts
When considering the judicial role in disambiguating a specific
contractual term, one is not concerned with gaps in the sense that the parties
failed to provide for some class of contingencies, such as the dealer's not
using his best efforts to promote his supplier's product. The problem instead
is that it is not clear what the term the parties used to plug the gap means.
These cases could be turned into "gap" cases by redefining "gap" to mean
not just the omission of a term but a gap in meaning because the term the
parties included is unclear with reference to the particular contingency that
has materialized. They may have specified that the goods subject to the
contract be transported on the ship Peerless,but it turns out that there are two
ships by that name to which the contract might refer. 15 Or the contract might
state in one place that the option created by it must be exercised "prior to
What is
April 5" and in another that the option is void "after April 5.
important is not whether these are called "gap" cases but that they call for a
different analysis from gap-filling rules. In the case of ambiguity the court
cannot just lift a ready-made clause off the shelf and plug it into the case to
decide the interpretive question, reasonably confident that if the rule didn't
fit the parties would have excluded it from their contract.
15. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. Ch. 1864) (discussed in POSNER, supra note
7, at 104). The contract was for the sale of cotton at a fixed price, and the two ships sailed at
different times. Because the price of cotton was volatile, the value of the contract to the purchaser
would depend on the date on which he received the cotton and could resell it. The date the cotton
was received would depend, in turn, on when the ship sailed. For a comprehensive analysis of the
case in its historical context, see A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW
135-62 (1995).
(7th Cir. 1998).
F.3d1589
689 2004-2005
Indus.,
Inc.,
16. Swiss Bank Corp. v. Dresser
HeinOnline
-- 83
Tex141
L. Rev.

1590

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 83:1581

There are several ways in which the court might proceed:
(1) Try to determine what the parties really meant; that is, assume they
resolved the interpretive issue in their negotiations but just did not express
their resolution clearly.
(2) Try to determine what resolution the parties would have agreed to
had the issue occurred to them when they were negotiating the contract.
(3) Pick the economically efficient solution on the assumption that that
is probably what the parties intended, or at least would have intended had
they thought about the issue. This approach is especially useful when the
parties' actual intentions regarding the interpretive issue cannot be recovered
and inquiry shifts to hypothetical intent, as in approach 2 above.
(4) Treat the case as a toss-up and apply some rule for breaking ties,
such as that ambiguities are resolved against the party trying to enforce the
contract (which is what the court did in Raffles v. Wichelhaus) or against the
party that drafted the contract. The second of these tie-breaking rules, contra
proferentum, is conventionally defended on the ground that the drafting party
may be able to pull a fast one on the other party, a defense that fails when the
other party is commercially sophisticated. 17 But it still may be a serviceable
tie-breaker when all interpretive measures fail. And later I will propose a
rationale for the measure that is distinct from though related to the "pull a
fast one" rationale and may retain force even in cases in which the
nondrafting party is commercially sophisticated.
(5) Combine 1 and 4 by pretending that a written contract always
embodies the complete agreement of the parties and that no other evidence of
the contract's meaning, besides the text itself, is to be considered. This is the
method of formalist (literalist, textualist) interpretation.
Each approach has a different set of benefits and costs. The first
involves the greatest benefits but also the highest costs. The benefits and
costs of the second are slightly lower. It might seem that the third approach
would confer the greatest benefits because it would produce the most efficient interpretation. But that is doubtful. If the parties are better judges of
their self-interest than a court is-the correct assumption, since the parties
both have a greater stake and know more about their own circumstances than
a court could know-then their intentions, whether actual or (if the court can
acquire real confidence that it knows what these parties would have decided
had the interpretive issue occurred to them) hypothetical, will provide a
better guide to what the efficient terms would be than a court's attempt to
determine them directly.
Resolving an ambiguity by guessing what
interpretation would be efficient is a second-best method of interpretation;
17. See Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 858-59 (7th Cir. 2002); Miss.
Pac. R.R. v. Kan. Gas & Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 796, 799-800 (10th Cir. 1988); First State
Underwriters Agency of New England Reinsurance Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308,
1311-12 (3d Cir. 1986). HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1590 2004-2005
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the best, when it can be done at a reasonable cost, is determining the
contractual meaning that the parties intended, or that they would have
intended had they thought about the issue.
Against this it can be argued that neither party is interested in efficiency
as such, but only in maximizing his profit, and so a party that, perhaps by
exploiting superior knowledge, can obtain a larger slice of a smaller pie may
be better off than if the contract maximized the joint surplus. This is
certainly possible, but presumably occurs in only a minority of cases. And
from a dynamic as distinct from a static perspective, we probably want
businesspeople to be able to profit from superior knowledge, in order to
create adequate incentives to produce knowledge.
But while approach 3 thus probably yields lower benefits than 1 or 2 in
most cases, it also imposes lower costs when it enables substituting the
court's best guess as to the interpretation that would maximize the joint
surplus of the contract, viewed ex ante, for a painstaking inquiry into the
parties' actual or hypothetical intentions. But if the court truncates its
inquiry by pretending that contractual interpretation is purely semantic,
approach 5, both benefits and costs are probably even lower.
The fourth approach, the use of a tie breaker, is the cheapest of all but in
most cases yields the fewest benefits. Indeed, the benefits may be negative if
the prospect of an arbitrary judicial resolution of a contractual dispute
induces parties to expend greater resources on careful drafting. Approach 5
may work in the same direction by truncating judicial inquiry into the
contract's meaning, though this will depend on the cost and accuracy of the
more searching judicial inquiry envisaged by approach 3 and especially 1.
In some cases, the information required by the first three approaches
will not be obtainable at a reasonable cost, just as in the case in which the
contract omits the price or quantity term. There was no way in Raffles v.
Wichelhaus to determine either which ship the parties would have picked had
they known there were more than one or which pick would have been the
more efficient. When neither party is blamable, 18 or both parties are equally
blamable,' 9 for an incurable uncertainty in their contract, it makes economic
sense to allow the contract to be rescinded. 20 For in such a case there is no
18. See Oswald v. Allen, 417 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that two conflicting
understandings of the contract were both sensible).
19. See Balistreri v. Nev. Livestock Prod. Credit Ass'n, 262 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (finding that "[d]ue to mutual mistake as to the deed of trust's subject matter, no contract
between appellants and respondent was formed").
20. See Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M, Chi. Graphic Communications Int'l
Union, AFL-CIO, 20 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1994). But this is in general rather than in every case.
As Scott Hemphill has pointed out to me, rescission should not be ordered if the consequence is a
windfall to one of the parties, even if the party was blameless for the mistake giving rise to the
claim for rescission. In Raffles, the contract was a losing one for the buyers whichever date the
cotton was shipped on, so that by rescinding the contract they were able to shift to the seller a loss
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presumption that one party was trying to repudiate a value-maximizing
transaction. But the qualification "equally blamable" is important, because
one function of contract enforcement, as we will see, is to penalize a party
who negligently creates interpretive uncertainty.
The fifth, or formalist, approach, traditionally associated with
Williston's contract treatise and contrasted with the "realist" approach of
2
Corbin's treatise, has been making a comeback in the academic literature. 1
This may be due in part to the fact that fewer and fewer legal academics have
significant experience in the "real world" of contract drafting or business
litigation. With academics as with judges, the less one knows about the real
world setting of a contract, the less comfortable one is apt to be with an
interpretive approach that emphasizes that setting; one will prefer to remain
on the semantic surface.
IV. The Interpretive Medium: Judges, Jurors, and Arbitrators
Since the first interpretive approach-an effort to reconstruct the
parties' actual intentions with respect to the issue on which the contract is
ambiguous-yields the greatest benefits, we should consider carefully how
its costs might be reduced without a greater reduction in benefits. In
conducting this inquiry, we must bear in mind that the costs include error
costs as well as the legal and other costs, including judicial resources, that are
directly incurred in litigating a contract case. There are two general ways of
reducing the costs of determining the parties' intentions. One has to do with
the interpreter, the other with the scope of allowable evidence, and they are
related. I begin with the interpreter.
At one extreme, imagine that a fully professionalized, competent, and
honest judiciary is assigned to determine the meaning of a contract.22 Error
costs would be minimized. Governmental costs might be high because of the
salary and other expenses of a high-quality tribunal. Yet equally they might
be low if the high quality of the court's decisions resulted in a lower
litigation rate because parties to contracts had less incentive to raise spurious

21. See, e.g., Symposium, FormalismRevisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999). For rebuttal,
see, for example, David V. Snyder, Languageand Formalitiesin Commercial Contracts:A Defense
of Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617 (2001), and for a good discussion of the opposing
camps, see CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, THE LAW MERCHANT IN THE MODERN AGE: INSTITUTIONAL

DESIGN AND INTERNATIONAL USAGES UNDER THE CISG (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 04-005, 2004). Most of the criticism of "realist" interpretation of
contracts has focused on the Uniform Commercial Code rather than the common law. See, e.g.,
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Ben-Shahar, supra note 2. My focus in this
Article is on common law contract interpretation.
22. Later I will consider the choice between a lateral-entry judiciary, which draws judges from
a legal practice in which they may have acquired some commercial know-how, and a career
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1592 2004-2005
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interpretive issues. For then the judiciary would be smaller and so its
expense would be lower.
But there are complications. Although the greater investment of
governmental resources per case might be offset by lower costs of litigation
to the parties because the judges would need less help from the lawyers to
reach a correct result, the reduction in the private costs of litigation might
lead to an increase in the litigation rate. The high quality of the judiciary
would also attract dispute-resolution business from arbitration. It might even
increase the number of contracts, some fraction of which would give rise to
litigated disputes. Substitutes for contracts become less attractive the lower
contractual transaction costs are, and contracts are likely to be shorter the
more competent the judges are because lawyers will not have to spell out
everything for a dim interpreter.2 3 So lower contractual transaction costs
result in more contracts, which may result in more contract litigation even if
the rate of that litigation falls. But the net social benefits of the additional
contracts would presumably exceed the costs of litigating the small
percentage of those contracts that would give rise to litigation. For it is
implausible that the modest judicial subsidy of contracts, arising from the
fact that parties to lawsuits do not bear the expenses incurred by the judiciary
in enforcing contracts, results in inefficient contracts.
At the other extreme, consider a judiciary that is incompetent or corrupt,
or more likely both. The costs of using such a judiciary either to ascertain
the parties' intentions or to make a best guess concerning the most efficient
resolution of the interpretive question might be prohibitive. The third or
fourth approach-the use of tie breakers or literal interpretation-would
probably be best. Either one would increase the parties' costs of negotiation
and drafting, but the total costs would probably be lower than if the judiciary
tried to resolve ambiguities. An incompetent judiciary could not perform the
task satisfactorily, and uncertainty in interpretation would make it difficult to
determine whether decisions were corrupt. It is easier to detect judicial
corruption when the judicial function is cut and dried. If the only thing a
judge is permitted to look at is the written contract-a public documentincompetent or corrupt contract decisions, which cannot be taken seriously as
products of reasonable interpretation, will be easily detected.
Later I will consider judges who are intermediate between the two
extremes that I have just sketched, but here I want to consider two alternative
institutions of contract interpretation. One is the lay jury, which plays a
significant role in the American system of contract adjudication, though in
few, maybe no, others. The other is arbitration. Contract arbitration is
commonly performed by lay persons who, unlike jurors, have commercial
23. See John H. Langbein, Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complex Contracts,
35 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 385-87 (1987) (contrasting the European legal system with the American
system and noting the effects on business planners); Hill & King, supra note 12, at 904-06
(describing the German legal system's
approach
to L.
contract
cases).
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experience and usually some expertise in interpreting the type of contract at

issue. One motivation for including an arbitration clause in a contract is to
avoid the vagaries of determinations made by triers of fact such as jurors and

judges. Jurors rarely have commercial experience, and are generally, and I
think correctly, considered unreliable judges of contract issues. And to the

extent that arbitrators are considered more reliable interpreters, we can
expect contracts containing arbitration clauses to be, other things being
equal, shorter than contracts that do not contain arbitration clauses. This is a
testable proposition, but testing it would be complicated by the fact that the

complexity and length of a contract might be a reason for the parties'
distrusting a jury's ability to interpret it, and therefore a spur to the inclusion

of an arbitration clause.
Distrust of conventional triers of fact is not the only motive for the
inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract; it may not even be the main
motive, considering how often arbitration is chosen in legal systems that do
not use juries in civil cases. Other motives are privacy; 24 the desire of the
parties to have their disputes resolved on the basis of commercial custom

rather than the formal law of a particular jurisdiction; a belief that arbitrators
are less subject to various cognitive illusions, such as hindsight bias, than

jurors; 25 and, because arbitrators are believed to tend toward middle-of-theroad results (as otherwise they are unlikely to be selected for future
6

arbitrations), risk aversion.2
Another motive for including an arbitration clause in a contract is that
the party that expects to be sued if the contractual relationship breaks down

will want such a clause because the middle-of-the-road propensity of
arbitrators will reduce the party's expected liability. A brokerage firm, for

example, will want to have an arbitration clause because it is more likely to
be sued by a customer than to sue a customer. Now one might think that if
including an arbitration clause would favor one party over the other, the other
24. Judicial records are, with rare exceptions, public documents.
25. Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 105, 107. But again, I must reiterate that arbitration is often
selected when the alternative is a trial by judge and not by a jury.
26. See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in PrivateJudging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523 (1997)
(stating that arbitrator self-interest has "long been familiar in collective bargaining cases because
repeat business is likely only if the arbitrator retains the goodwill of both union and management");
Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 159 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000) (stating that parties may each misrepresent their positions
because they expect arbitrators to "split the difference" between their extreme demands); Jane
Spencer, Waiving Your Right to a Jury Trial, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2004, at Dl (reporting the
increase in the number of contracts abandoning arbitration clauses in exchange for clauses waiving
jury trial). Although the belief that arbitrators tend to be "difference splitters" is widespread, it has
yet to be empirically verified. Drahozal, supra note 25, at 114-18. But there is some support for it
in findings that there is less variance in arbitrators' awards than in jury awards. See id. at 118.
Since the lower end of the range of possible awards is truncated at zero, a reduction in variance is
likely to reduce the average award. This would supply a motive for the contract party who was
more likely to be sued thanHeinOnline
to sue for breach
of L.
contract
to want
an arbitration clause in the contract.
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party would object or would demand compensation. But it might not bother
to do so because the expected cost of arbitration would be difficult to
estimate and probably slight when discounted by the probability of a breach
of contract that would lead to an actual suit. This explanation is parallel to
why one-sided form contracts in consumer transactions might be a
competitive equilibrium.
Of course if "middle of the road" were taken literally, potential
defendants would derive no benefit. Suppose half the plaintiffs in some class
of cases have meritless suits and therefore ought to receive zero damages,
and half have meritorious cases and damages of $10,000. The defendant is
no better off if arbitrators award $5,000 in all the cases. But if, as is likely,
most suits are clearly without merit, so that the arbitrators feel comfortable in
awarding zero relief in those cases, their middle-of-the-road propensity will
operate only in the meritorious cases, and so will truncate the defendant's
liability.
Mistrust of jurors as contract interpreters is further evidenced by the
growing practice of including a jury waiver in contracts.27 If the only motive
for arbitration is to avoid a jury, such a waiver is an attractive alternative to
an arbitration clause, especially for a party that does not anticipate an advantage from middle-of-the-road judging. Most courts will enforce contractual
jury waivers. 2 8 However, some will not,29 and a number of courts will
invoke "a presumption against denying a jury trial based on waiver," with the
result that such "waivers must be strictly construed. 30 The refusal to enforce
such clauses and even the presumption make no sense. 31 The usual reason
given is that because the right to a jury trial is "highly favored, a waiver will
be strictly construed. 3 2 "Favoring" juries to resolve commercial disputes is
either silly sentimentalism or a yielding to the trial lawyers' lobby. But a
more important point is that these same courts enforce arbitration clauses,
which involve a waiver not only of a jury but also of a judge, as a matter of
course. It would be interesting to see whether, as my analysis implies,
arbitration clauses are more common in contracts governed by the law of
states that refuse to enforce jury waivers.
27. See Spencer, supra note 26.
28. See, e.g., Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002);
Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Malan Realty

Investors, Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Mo. 1997); Uribe v. Merchs. Bank, 642 N.Y.S.2d
23, 24 (App. Div. 1996); Emerald Tex., Inc. v. Peel, 920 S.W.2d 398, 403 (Tex. App. 1996); Gelco
Corp. v. Campanile Motor Serv., Inc., 677 So. 2d 952, 952 (Fla. App. 1996).
29. See, e.g., Bank S. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994); Grafton Partners LP v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 513 (App. 2004).
30. Med Air Tech. Corp., 303 F.3d at 18.
31. The issue is helpfully discussed in Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver
Clauses and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,

Winter/Spring 2004, at 167.
32. Gaylord Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586, 588 (Ala. 1981); see also, e.g., N.
Charleston Joint Venture v. Kitchens
of Island
416
S.E.2d 637, 638 (S.C. 1992).
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The relativity of legal doctrine to the character and quality of the
adjudicative system is well recognized in the law of evidence. The rules of
evidence are primarily devices for jury control; the rules exist in severely
attenuated form, if at all, in legal systems that do not use juries. What is less
well recognized is that the same is true with respect to the substantive law of
contracts, and doubtless other fields as well.
V.

Interpretive Doctrines

My discussion of the doctrines of contract interpretation will be
selective. I will not discuss the interpretive rules one finds in manuals of
contract drafting, such rules as "between repugnant clauses, a possible
interpretation which removes the conflict will be adopted," or "a contract
susceptible of two meanings will be given the meaning which will render it
valid., 33 I cannot make much sense of these. If two clauses are "repugnant,"
it is entirely possible that they are so because the parties goofed; why
suppose that a meaning that will make a contract valid is superior to one that
invalidates it, if the former would result in a transaction to which the parties
would have been highly unlikely to agree? In my judicial experience, these
rules are rarely invoked in litigation, unlike the ones that I shall discuss.
A. The "FourCorners" Rule
Well before arbitration became a widely used or fully accepted method
for resolving contract disputes, U.S. courts were, by limiting the jury's
interpretive role, providing protection to contracting parties who did not want
to take a chance with a jury's resolving interpretive disputes. The courts did
and do this in two interlocking ways-by limiting the jury's role and by
limiting the scope of allowable evidence. Both are illustrated by the "four
comers" rule, a basic rule of contract interpretation in American law. The
rule bars the parties to a written contract that is "clear on its face"--meaning
that a reader who is competent in English but unaware of the agreement's
context would think the writing admitted of only one meaning-from
presenting evidence bearing on interpretation, which is to say "extrinsic"
evidence-evidence outside the "four comers" of the written contract. The
judge alone determines what the contract means when no extrinsic evidence
is presented because he is a more competent interpreter of a document than a
34

jury is.

33. SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING CONTRACTS, § 7.1, at 90 (3d ed. 2003)
(quoting LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1965)). I do not
mean to denigrate the value of handbooks of contract drafting. For good examples, see ROBERT A.
FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE CONTRACTS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE

(2d ed. 1999); Justin Sweet, The Lawyer's Role in ContractDrafting, 43 J. ST. B.CAL. 362 (1968).
34. Notice that "extrinsic" is redundant, since the written contract itself is not evidence, that is,
as2004-2005
a trier of fact.
or to the judge
it is not submitted to a jury
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But is this really a rule of "interpretation"? If the contract is clear, there
is no need to interpret it. If it is unclear, the rule provides no guidance to
extracting its meaning. The real significance of the rule, therefore, is in
preventing juries from disregarding the actual, ascertainable meaning of a
contract, as they might be inclined to do either because they were
sympathetic to one side of the dispute or because they were credulous about
testimony by one of the contracting parties that they meant something
different from what the contract states. The rule is based, in other words, on
the idea that "parties to contracts may prefer, ex ante (that is, when
negotiating the contract, and therefore before an interpretive dispute has
arisen), to avoid the expense and uncertainty of having a jury resolve a
dispute between them, even at the cost of some inflexibility in
interpretation., 35 The added expense is due mainly to the fact that jury trials
are on average longer than bench trials.36 This is because of the time
required for the jury voir dire and jury instructions and deliberations, because
matters have to be explained to juries at greater length than to a judge, and
because more attention is paid to making and ruling on objections to the
admission of evidence in a jury trial than in a bench trial.
It would be better to say, however, that parties "sometimes" prefer ex
ante to avoid a jury. For as I noted earlier in explaining interpretive approach
number 4, of which the "four comers" rule might be thought an instance, to
trigger the rule the parties have to invest resources in making their written
contract clear on its face. Thus while this rule, like the rule that makes arbitration clauses binding and enforceable, enables contracting parties to protect
themselves from the vagaries and additional expense of jury trials, it does so
at some expense to them in added costs of negotiation and drafting. In the
case of arbitration, the added expense takes the form of the arbitrators' fees,
which the parties, not the taxpayer, pay.
As critics of pushing the four comers rule too hard like to point out, one
can never be completely confident of being able to determine the meaning of
a document from the document alone. "[C]Ilarity in a contract is a property of
the correspondence between the contract and the things or activities that it
regulates, and not just of the semantic surface., 37 The contract's words point
out to the real world, and the real world may contain features that make
seemingly clear words, sentences, and even entire documents ambiguous.
35. FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 1989). On the problems involved
in submitting contract disputes to resolution by juries, see, for example, Proteus Books Ltd. v.
Cherry Lane Music Co., 873 F.2d 502, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that a jury award totaling
over $3.5 million was "not supported by the evidence").
36. In the federal courts, jury trials are on average more than twice as long as bench trials.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193 n.1 (1996).
37. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 1995); see also,
e.g., Mar Oil, S.A. v. Morrissey, 982 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that in a contract dispute
"a court should find an agreement too indefinite" to be enforceable only when its meaning cannot be
determined by reference to external
circumstances).
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No one just from reading the contract in Raffles v. Wichelhaus would have
thought there was an ambiguity as to which ship the cotton was supposed to
be shipped on; the ambiguity was "extrinsic" but none the less real. In such a
case the four corners rule yields no result; either reading of the contract in
Raffles v. Wichelhaus-one in which the cotton was to be shipped by the
Peerless that was sailing earlier, the other in which it was to be shipped by
the later-sailing Peerless-was equally consistent with the words of the
contract.
What is important is that the four corners rule not be permitted to
unravel completely, as it would if a party to a contract were permitted to
testify that although the contract seems clear, really the parties were using
words in a special way. Critics denounce the rule as philosophically naive
because meaning does not reside in a document but rather is extracted or,
perhaps better, imparted by a reader equipped with the requisite linguistic
and cultural competence. In a section of Wigmore's famous treatise on
evidence, captioned "General Principle: All Extrinsic Circumstances May be
Considered," we read:
Once freed from the primitive formalism which views the document as
a self-contained and self-operative formula, we can fully appreciate
the modem principle that the words of a document are never anything
but indices to extrinsic things, and that therefore all the circumstances
must be consideredwhich go to make
clear the sense of the words,38
that is, their associations with things.
The mistake is in the word "therefore." From the undeniable fact that
contract interpretation requires that the interpreter know the language in
which the contract is written, the meaning of a contractual commitment, and
much else besides, it does not follow that "all" the circumstances relating to
making sense of the contract should be matters for inquiry at trial. The
critics have missed the point. The four corners rule merely bespeaks
skepticism that taking evidence is always the best way to resolve a legal
dispute over a contract's meaning.
There is a happy medium, and that is to allow extrinsic ambiguity to be
shown only by objective evidence. 39 By "objective," I mean to exclude a

38. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE

IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2470, at 224, 227 (3d ed. 1940); see also STANLEY FISH, THERE'S
No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO 148 (1994) ("What becomes clear
is that the determination of what is 'inside' will always be a function of whatever 'outside' has
already been assumed."). For criticism, see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 245-46
(rev. & enlarged ed. 1998) ("[W]ritten contracts would mean little if a party could try to persuade a
jury that while the contract said X, the parties had actually agreed, without telling anybody or
writing anything down, that the deal was Y.").
39. For cases applying this principle, see Mathews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 467
(7th Cir. 1998); Cole Taylor Bank v. Truck Ins. Exch., 51 F.3d 736, 737-38 (7th Cir. 1995); AM
Int'l, Inc., 44 F.3d at 575; Kerin v. United States Postal Serv., 116 F.3d 988, 992 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997);
Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse
Corp.,
66 1598
F.3d 2004-2005
604, 614 (3d Cir. 1995); Carey Can., Inc.
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party's self-serving testimony that cannot be verified because it concerns his
state of mind or a conversation to which the only witness was the other party
to the contract, and that party either denies that the conversation took place
or disagrees about what was said. That there were two ships Peerless which
could have transported the cotton that was the subject of the contract was a
readily verifiable fact, in contrast to the unverifiable assertion of an
interested party. Similarly, dictionaries, articles, treatises, and evidence of
custom or trade usage that gives special meaning to words that a reader of the
contract, ignorant of the trade, might suppose were being used in their
everyday sense are objective sources of facts because they are not within the
parties' control. Such evidence is harder to fake 40 than parties' testimony
concerning their intentions and understandings and unrecorded, unwitnessed
conversations. 4' The parties' behavior, as distinct from their assertions, at
least when it predates the beginning of the controversy and so is4not
plausibly
3
42
term.
the
of
sense
my
in
objective
also
is
strategic,
as
regarded
An alternative to the position that only objective evidence may be used
to demonstrate that seemingly clear contractual language is ambiguous is to
have the judge screen the evidence that is offered to demonstrate ambiguity;
only if he thinks it really does demonstrate ambiguity does he allow the jury
to use it to determine the contract's true meaning. This is the approach of the
much-criticized but also widely followed" Pacific Gas & Electric case.4 5
But the difference between it and the "objective evidence" approach that I
champion seems small; notice their common roots in concern that jurors
might be swayed by spurious but perhaps plausible testimony.
Contracting parties who do not want the court to stray even this far from
the written word can provide in their contract that the court should base its
interpretation solely on the words of the contract, although I have not found a
v. Columbia Cas. Co., 940 F.2d 1548, 1557-58 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Mellon Bank v. Aetna Bus. Credit,
Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1009-13 (3d Cir. 1980).
40. See In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1994). I am aware of
criticisms that evidence of trade usage can be misleading too. For a balanced practitioner-oriented
discussion, see FELDMAN & NIMMER, supra note 33, at § 5.03 (Supp. 2005).

41. See Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1994); Int'l Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 145 (3d Cir.
1999); Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988).
42. See Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 180 (1st Cir. 1995).
43. See Mathews, 144 F.3d at 469.
44. See, e.g., Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1140 (Ariz. 1993).
45. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968);
see E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.12, at 479-80 (1999). For criticism, which may
reflect a misunderstanding of the scope of the decision, see Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[I]t matters not how clearly a contract is written, nor how
completely it is integrated, nor how carefully it is negotiated, nor how squarely it addresses the issue
before the court: the contract cannot be rendered impervious to attack by parol evidence."). As my
court explained in Cole Taylor Bank v. Truck Insurance Exchange, "California decisions since

Trident have declined to endorse that decision's interpretation of California law." 51 F.3d 736, 737
(7th Cir. 1995).
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case in which such a provision was mentioned. Maybe this is because the
parol evidence rule, discussed in the next subpart, bars the introduction of the
most questionable form of extrinsic evidence-self-serving testimony by one
of the parties as to what the parties really agreed to in the negotiations
leading up to the signing of the contract.4 6 Contracts do, however,
sometimes contain disclaimers barring trade usage as an aid in
interpretation 47 or other disclaimers of conventional interpretive rules. 4s
The incorporation of trade usage into contracts is closely related to
judicial gap filling through interpolation of best-efforts, good-faith, and other
implied ("default") terms, and it can be defended on similar grounds. 4 9 Were

evidence of trade usage barred in contract litigation, parties to contracts
would be driven to include additional detail in their contracts, for example
definitions of terms that might be taken in the wrong sense by a court
ignorant of how the terms were used in the industry to which the contract
pertained. The need to add this detail would increase the costs of negotiation
and drafting, while the benefits would be realized only in the small minority
of cases that would result in a legal dispute.
Cases like Raffles in which trade usage or other objective evidence
cannot be used to disambiguate a contract are often classified as "mutual
mistake" cases. That is a misleading usage. It implies that if one party to a
contract testifies that "we thought we were agreeing to X, even though the
contract says Y," he has created a triable issue. That would be destabilizing.
What the cases that allow rescission on the ground of "mutual mistake" are
really about is a demonstrable real-world fact that makes a semantically

46. "A merger clause attempts to restrict an adjudicator's interpretive base to the written words"
of the contract. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting, 20
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 2, 22 (2004). A merger clause, as we are about to see, is the standard method of
invoking the parol evidence rule.
47. FELDMAN & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 5.03[A][3] (Supp. 2005).
48. For example, disclaimer of contra proferentum: "The canon of contract interpretation that
ambiguities, if any, in a writing be construed against the drafter shall not apply to this Agreement."
Rowan Companies, Inc., Asset Purchase Sale Agreement Between Era Aviation, Inc. and Columbia
Helicopters, Inc. (Dec. 5, 1995) (on file with the Texas Law Review). This is one of the tens of
thousands of contracts contained and searchable electronically in the very valuable and underused

Digital Contracts Library maintained by the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute
(CORI) at the University of Missouri and available at http://cori.missouri.edu. On CORI's contract
and other projects, see Michael E. Sykuta, Empirical Research on the Economics of Organization
and the Role of the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI), at

http://cori.missouri.edu/WPS/Sykuta-CORI.pdf (Dec 19, 2001). The importance of the CORI
Contracts Database is that the contracts that get litigated to the appellate level, which are the
contracts that scholars mainly discuss, are not a random sample of all contracts. To the extent that
the database contains a representative sample of particular classes of contract, it might enable an
empirical determination of which, if any, judicially implied contract terms and interpretive doctrines
are being regularly negated by contract drafters. This is a rich area for further research.
49. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193 (Kraus & Walt eds.
2000).
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1600 2004-2005

2005]

Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation

1601

unproblematic contract either insolubly ambiguous or nonsensical. It is an
example of the dependence of meaning on context.
Rescission is the usual result when mutual mistake is found, but
sometimes the result is the reformation of the contract. An interesting though
Inc.50
questionable example is Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group,
ALCOA signed a contract with Essex in 1967 to convert Essex's alumina
into aluminum. Because the contract had a long term (21 years, at Essex's
option), the parties included a price escalator clause based in part on the
Energy is a small
wholesale price index for industrial commodities.
component of the index but the major input into the manufacture of
aluminum. As a result of the steep increase in the price of oil and therefore
in the cost of electricity in 1973 and 1974, ALCOA's cost of contractual
performance rose much faster than the WPI, precipitating its suit for
reformation. The court ruled in ALCOA's favor, holding that the parties had
intended the price escalator clause to reflect the real increase in ALCOA's
costs over the life of the contract.
I am unconvinced. ALCOA is a highly sophisticated company with
long experience in contracting, and in designing the price escalator clause
had consulted no less a figure than Alan Greenspan, at the time a leading
economic consultant. As between ALCOA and Essex, it would seem that the
former was the superior bearer of the risk of an unexpected increase in cost,
and that might seem to argue for resolving doubts about the meaning of the
clause against ALCOA; but I am dubious of that rationale, for a reason I will
explain when I discuss the doctrine of contraproferentum.
The reason why ALCOA should have lost lies elsewhere. The greater
the value of a contract, the higher the socially cost-justified expenditure of
the parties on making the contract complete at the drafting stage. This opens
up the possibility that ALCOA may not have invested enough care in
drafting the price escalator clause. Borrowing from the economics of torts,
we might ask who the "cheapest cost avoider" in the case was-that is, who
could at least cost have minimized the transaction costs (broadly defined, as
throughout this Article, to include dispute-resolution and error costs) that
ensued from the mismatch between the price escalator clause and the actual
cost conditions of contract performance that gave rise to the litigation. In
some cases it will be the court because the costs of drafting to avoid the
mistake that later gave rise to the litigation would have exceeded the
expected benefits; if so, it would probably be better, that is cheaper, to allow
the court to complete the contract if and when a dispute arises. But it seems
pretty clear that ALCOA was the cheaper cost avoider; its mistake was careless in the economic, which is also the legal, sense of a large gap between the
lower costs of error avoidance and the higher costs of error. Eminent as
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Greenspan was, ALCOA itself should have realized that the WPI did not
track its own cost structure.
Rescission on grounds of mutual mistake should be reserved for cases in
which neither party is the cheaper cost avoider. This is another reason for
thinking the term "mutual mistake" unhelpful; it does not point to the
operative consideration, which is whether either party was at greater fault in
failing to anticipate and provide for the contingency that has given rise to the
legal dispute. Although the court in ALCOA discussed the issue of the price
escalator clause in terms of mutual mistake, impossibility, and frustration, the
issue was at bottom an interpretive one.
Because the probability of experiencing significant cost increases during
the life of the contract was significant and the potential consequences
substantial, ALCOA could reasonably have been adjudged to have failed to
invest sufficiently in making the contract clear at the outset. The less likely a
contingency is to materialize, the less likely that an investment in careful
drafting would be cost-justified; it would be better to let the court complete
the contract in the few cases in which the contingency does materialize. Yet
the lower that probability, the lower the expected benefits of judicial
intervention. So maybe courts should refuse to decide cases in which a
contract is upended by a low-probability event! But that would be mistaken
on two counts. First, if the expected benefits of judicial intervention are
small, so are the expected costs. Second, while the probability of a particular
contingency materializing may be slight; the probability that some
contingency in what may be a very extensive array of low-probability events
will materialize may be great. If there are ten independent events and each
has a probability of occurring of one percent, the probability that at least one
of them will occur is only a shade under ten percent. In such a case it may be
more economical for the court to stand ready to interpret the contract with
regard to any contingency that may arise than for the parties to try to
anticipate and provide specifically for each possible contingency. This point
is obscured by the fact that in ALCOA the single contingency of a steep
increase in the cost of performing the contract was foreseeable in the
conventional legal sense that it was sufficiently probable that making
provision for it in the contract was cost-justified.
B. The ParolEvidence Rule
Another important limitation on the jury's role in contract interpretation
and, concomitantly, on the breadth of the permitted evidentiary inquiry is the
parol evidence rule. If the parties have a written contract that looks complete
("integrated," in the jargon of contract law-and so parties wanting the
protection of the parol evidence rule will usually include a clause in the
contract, called a "merger clause," stating that the contract is indeed
integrated), evidence concerning the negotiations leading up to the execution
of the contract will be inadmissible to contradict its terms-to create, that is,
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1602 2004-2005
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an interpretive issue for a jury to chew over. So just as the parties choose
whether to have a written contract and whether to include an arbitration
clause, they also choose whether to state that their contract is integrated and
by so doing to limit further the role of the jury or judge as the trier of fact and
the expense of litigating a suit should their contractual relationship break
down.
The parol evidence rule overlaps the four comers rule but is not
identical because it forbids only the use of evidence of the precontractual
negotiations to contradict the written contract. The four comers rule goes
further by prohibiting the use of extrinsic evidence to supplement rather than
only to contradict the written contract.
If a contract does not contain an integration clause, parol evidence will
be admissible in the first instance for the limited purpose of enabling the
judge to decide whether the contract was intended by the parties to be
integrated-to represent the complete expression of their agreement. Only if
the evidence convinces the judge that the parties did not intend the contract
to be integrated will he allow the jury to resolve the interpretive dispute with
the aid of such evidence.
C. ExtrinsicNonevidence or the "Best Guess" Rule
Probably more important in the American system of contractual
interpretation than either the four comers rule or the parol evidence rule in
limiting the scope of the jury and the frequency of trials in contract cases is
the tendency of courts-a proclivity, a preference, rather than the dictate of a
rule-to resolve contractual ambiguities without recourse to extrinsic
evidence and thus without a trial, by making a "best guess." I am using
"evidence" here in the standard legal sense of materials that create a
contestable issue that requires a trial to resolve. If a contract is not clear on
its face, but instead is vague or ambiguous, 51 the judge will have to go outside the contract to decide what it means. But he can go outside it without
getting entangled in the sort of factual disagreements that require a trial to
untangle-in other words, without taking evidence. He can for example use
common sense, which "is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the
dictionary or the arsenal of canons. 5 2 Because the simplest, most intuitive
economic thinking is close to being common sense, we can begin to sense the
importance of interpretive approach number 3-using an efficiency norm to
interpret ambiguous contractual terms. Generally speaking, contracts seek
(1) to assign the risk of some adverse event that would frustrate performance
either to the party that can prevent the event at the least cost or, if the event is
51. Though often used as synonyms, purists distinguish the two terms, defining "vague" as
indefinite in extension and "ambiguous" as having two or more possible meanings. I do not
understand the relevance of the distinction to the interpretation of contracts.
2001).
F.3d
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not preventable at a reasonable cost, to the party that is the superior risk
bearer and (2) to prevent either party from taking advantage of vulnerabilities
created by nonsimultaneity of performance.5 3 Judges can understand this
without formal training in economics (though it helps if they have had some
practical experience with contracts), and they can often determine which
party is the superior risk avoider or risk bearer without taking evidence.
Suppose the litigants present rival interpretations of their contract to the
judge, and it is apparent, without the need for a trial to resolve a factual
disagreement, that one of these interpretations would make the contract
extremely one-sided. That would be a reason-call it common sense or, if
some explicit economic reasoning is employed, the promotion of
efficiency-for the judge to choose the other interpretation. "[S]ince most
though of course not all contracts involve the exchange of things of
commensurate value, an interpretation that makes a contract grossly onesided is suspect., 54 "People usually don't pay a price for a good or service
that is wildly in excess of its market value, or sell a good or service ... for a
price hugely less than its market value. ... .55
More broadly, "An
interpretation which sacrifices a major interest of one of the parties while
furthering only a marginal interest of the other should be rejected in favor of
an interpretation which sacrifices marginal interests of both parties in order
to protect their major concerns. 5 6
A closely related principle is that if it is apparent, again without having
to conduct a trial to resolve factual disagreements, that one of the rival
interpretations proposed does not make commercial sense, the interpretation
will be rejected because it probably does not jibe with what the parties
understood when they signed the contract. 57 "[A] contract will not be
53. See POSNER, supra note 7, § 4, at 95-98 (discussing the dangers of opportunism and
unforeseen contingencies arising from nonsimultaneity in transactions). For judicial illustrations of
the economic purpose of contracts, see Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.
1993) (en banc); Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594-96 (7th Cir. 1991);
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Town of Cloverdale, 699 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983). And recall my
discussion of the ALCOA case. See supra text accompanying note 50.
54. United States v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 75 F.3d 1146, 1151 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing RhonePoulenc Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 1299, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also In re Kazmierczak, 24
F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that "a proposed contractual interpretation that would read
out of a contract language obviously important to one of the parties faces and ought to face a
distinctly uphill struggle for judicial acceptance; it is plain implausible"); Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v.
Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 566 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that a "one-sided interpretation is
suspect"); Martin v. Vector Co., 498 F.2d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1974) (observing that a "one-sided
interpretation, placing all the risk on plaintiffs is, if not utterly beyond belief, at least so unusual
in... a bilateral contract that we think it unsupportable in the absence of evidence that such was
actually intended").
55. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 280 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2002).
56. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1051 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(Friendly, J.); cases cited in 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.11, at 471 n.23.
57. See Dispatch Automation, Inc. v. Richards, 280 F.3d 1116, 1119 (7th Cir. 2002); R.I.
Charities Trust v. Engelhard
Corp., 267
3, L.
7 (1st
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interpreted literally if doing so would produce absurd results, in the sense of
results that the parties, presumed to be rational persons pursuing rational
ends, are very unlikely to have agreed to seek.",58 And even if an
interpretation makes sense, it will be rejected if the rival interpretation is
markedly more sensible. "Agreements, especially commercial arrangements,
are designed to make sense. If one reading produces a plausible result for
which parties might be expected to bargain, that reading has a strong
presumption in its favor as against another reading producing an unlikely
result (e.g., windfall gains, conditions that cannot be satisfied, dubious
incentives). 5 9
Notice how four of the five interpretive methods that I introduced in
Part 111-trying to determine the parties' actual intentions, trying to
determine their hypothetical intentions, trying to figure out the efficient
resolution of their dispute, and trying to confine interpretation to the words of
the contract rather than dumping the interpretive issue in the lap of a jurytend to merge in practice. It would be one thing to impose the efficient
solution in the teeth of the parties' agreement. That would be not only
paternalistic but also reckless, because it would be rare that a judge or jury
had a better sense of what would be an efficient transaction than the parties
themselves had. But often, when the parties' intentions are not readily
inferable from the written contract, the best, the most cost-efficient, way to
resolve their dispute is not to take testimony and conduct a trial; it is to use
commercial or economic common sense to figure out how, in all likelihood,
the parties would have provided for the contingency that has arisen had they
foreseen it. It is a small step beyond literalism that preserves many of the
advantages of interpretive approach number 5. It is not invalidated by the
fact that circumstances will have changed between the drafting of the
contract and litigation over its meaning or that each party will search for
evidence to support its preferred interpretation, rather than for evidence
disinterestedly intended to illuminate the parties' original understanding.
An implication of this discussion is that the more the judge knows about
the commercial context of a contract, the easier it will be for him to interpret
it accurately without having to conduct a trial. 60 The experienced judge's
expertise is a substitute for the evidence that would be necessary to bring an

58. Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Nelson v. Schellpfeffer, 656 N.W.2d 740, 743 (S.D. 2003); Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood
Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 96 (3d Cir. 2001). The qualification implicit in "very unlikely" should be
noted; there is always a possibility that what seems absurd to a court was actually intended by the
parties.
59. Nat'l Tax Jnst., Inc. v. Topnotch at Stowe Resort & Spa, 388 F.3d 15, 19 (lst Cir. 2004);
see also Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vigo Coal Co., 393 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2004); Baldwin Piano,

Inc. v. Deutsche Wurlitzer GmbH, 392 F.3d 881, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2004).
60. This implication might be testable empirically by comparing the time from filing to
disposition of contract cases decided by judges who came to judging from a career in civil litigation
in prosecution.
to judging
a career
compared to judges who had come
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inexperienced judge up to the same level of knowledge. 6 1 This is a
conventional argument for the superiority of commercial arbitrators to judges
or jurors-that they are more knowledgeable about business and therefore
more likely to interpret ambiguous contractual language correctly and
without having to put the parties to the expense of presenting testimonial and
documentary evidence other than the contract itself. There is some evidence
that arbitration clauses are indeed more likely the less explicit the terms of a
contract are,62 though there is again a problem in determining the direction of
causation-the terms may be less explicit because the parties have faith in
the interpretive acumen of arbitrators.
Although I began this Part of the Article by offering the "rule" of
"extrinsic nonevidence" as a method of jury control, it is also a way of
reducing legal error. Not that judges cannot make mistakes in their appeal to
common sense and simple economic principles; but if they refuse to look
beyond the text, they are certain to make many errors. Because contracts can
never be complete (I once had a case in which the contract was 2000 pages
long but did not cover the issue that the parties were litigating 63), there is
always a possibility that the words chosen by the parties to describe their deal
will not match an unforeseen contingency that has arisen. What I am
describing as the "rule" of extrinsic nonevidence, or the "best guess"
approach, allows the judge to complete the contract in such a situation
without subjecting the parties to the vagaries of trial by jury.
All this assumes that the judges have some minimum competence in
understanding commercial dealings. The assumption is not always justified;
and when it is not, literalism may be the superior approach after all.
Williston and Corbin may not be inconsistent; they may simply have
different domains. Formalism in the sense of textualism may be the correct
approach not only when the judges are of dubious competence or honesty, as
I suggested earlier, 64 but also when, as in the European judiciaries-and
those of most other countries as well, such as Japan-they are career judges
with less real-world experience than English and American judges, who
generally become judges only after a career in practice. Judges in career
judiciaries tend to be specialists-and their specialty may be contract law or
even a subset of contract disputes, such as disputes arising from construction
contracts-but it is an unanswered question how far specialization within a
judicial career can substitute for experience as a practitioner.
A neglected drawback to formalist interpretation when judges have
some feel for commercial realities is that businessmen are not literalists.
They do not have the lawyer's exaggerated respect for the written word and
61. Katz, supra note 2, at 526.
62. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration:An Application to FranchiseContracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 558-62 (2003).
63. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 50 F.3d 476, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1995).
64. See supra Part IV.HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1606 2004-2005
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thus do not expect bizarre consequences to follow from mistakes in drafting.
There is frequent conflict between lawyer and client over how detailed a
contract should be, the former pushing for the inclusion of endless protective
clauses and the latter worrying that pressing for such clauses will not only
protract negotiations and increase legal fees but also make him seem a
sharpie and kill the deal. Better that the contract should be kept reasonably
short, and that if an unforeseen contingency arises it be resolved in a
commonsensical fashion. It is reassuring to think that if one's contract
should come to grief the court will straighten matters out in a "reasonable"
way rather than by recourse to legal technicalities. 65 Businessmen want
judges to resolve interpretive issues in the way that a reasonable businessman
would.
This is a conventional, though, as I have argued, probably a subordinate
reason for the inclusion of arbitration clauses in many contracts. I have not
heard it argued that a reason against including an arbitration clause is that
judges are literalists. Arbitration can be resisted because of arbitrators' fees
or their propensity to split the difference, but not I think because they are less
literal-minded than some judges.
A related point is that most contracts are enforced not by threat of legal
action but by the parties' concern for their commercial reputations. A firm
that acquires a reputation for not honoring its contracts will encounter
difficulty in finding others willing to contract with it on favorable terms. If
pragmatic judicial interpretation enables contracts to be short and simple, lay
monitoring of compliance will be easier and therefore more effective.
Even if courts were not only pragmatic but omniscient, some contracts
would be long. One function of a contract is simply to specify performance
in detail, so that the performing party knows exactly what he is expected to
do; construction contracts are a good example. And if the contract is
detailed, the parties may be able to resolve a dispute over it themselves and
thus without incurring the expense of a court proceeding.
D. Contra Proferentum
This is the traditional name of the doctrine that in cases of doubt an
ambiguity in a contract should be resolved against the party that drafted the
contract. The doctrine is applied with particular vehemence to insurance
contracts, and I have defended this result elsewhere on the ground that the
insurance company is the superior bearer of the risk of noncoverage due to
interpretive uncertainty. 66 The problem I now see with this defense is that
this risk cannot be quantified; and if an insurance company cannot attach a
probability to a risk, it cannot calculate the correct premium to charge for
bearing the risk.
65. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142-43 (1921).

at 108.
66. POSNER, supra note 7,HeinOnline
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The doctrine of contraproferentum may still be a sensible tiebreaker, on
the ground that the party who drafted the contract was probably in the better
position to avoid ambiguities. But this is not always the case. The other
party might have more information concerning the particular contingency
that gave rise to the legal dispute-hence the exception, recognized by a
number of courts, when the nondrafting party is commercially
sophisticated.67 In any event, I no longer think that there is a satisfactory
reason for applying the doctrine differently in insurance cases than in other
contract cases.
VI. The Formal Analysis Revisited
Recall equation (1): C = x +p(x)[y + z + e(x, y, z)], where x is the cost of
negotiating and writing the contract, p the probability of a legal dispute over
the meaning of the contract, y the cost of litigation to the parties, z the cost to
the judiciary, and e the social cost of an erroneous interpretation. I want to
elaborate on the relations among these variables.
We know that the cost of negotiation and drafting, x, is incurred with
probability 1, while the remaining costs are incurred only if there is
litigation, which has a probability ofp. As I have emphasized throughout the
Article, that probability is lower the higher x is-the more time the parties
spend negotiating and drafting the contract, the lower the probability that a
dispute over meaning will arise, because more of the possible contingencies
will be covered by explicit contractual language.
The cost of the litigation itself, the expression in brackets, consists of
the litigation costs incurred by the parties, y, which presumably are lower the
greater x and z are (the contract will be clearer, and the court will wield the
laboring oar); the cost to the judiciary of resolving the dispute, z, which
presumably is lower the higher x and y are (the more resources the parties
devote both to making the contract clearer and to presenting evidence in
support of their respective interpretations, the less burdensome the decision
of the case will be for the court-maybe; I will question this assumption
shortly); and the error cost, e, implicitly discounted by the probability that
the court will make an error.
Let me pause to discuss error for a moment. It is important to
distinguish between the distributive and the allocative aspect of a judicial
error in interpreting a contract. Suppose that A sues B for breach of contract,
and there really was a breach and A should have been awarded damages of
$1 million, but the court interprets the contract incorrectly and rules that
there was no breach, and so A gets nothing. A has lost $1 million but B has
gained the identical amount, so what is the net error cost? Is it anything
more than the parties' litigation expenses? I think it is, even if neither party
67. See, e.g., BeanstalkHeinOnline
Group, Inc.-- v.
Gen.
Corp.,
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is risk averse (but of course one or both may be). For one thing, the possible
outcomes may not be symmetrical; the judgment may impose greater costs
on one party than the benefits conferred on the other, though in that event we
would expect a corrective transaction-but it would not be costless. For
another thing, the more error prone the courts are, the more each party will
spend on x in an effort to draft so clearly that the court will not be able to
mistake its meaning to reduce the probability that there will be a judicial
error that will hurt it. So total expenditures at the negotiation and drafting
stage of the transaction will rise. (That is the probably the main cost of
erroneous interpretation of contracts.) Another possibility is that potential
contracting parties may be driven to substitute a less efficient method of
regulating their relationship than contract. There may also be external costs
if the institution of contracting is made more expensive, since contracts affect
other people and firms besides the parties to them.
The probability of error is lower the greater x, y, and z are-all are
inputs into clarifying the true meaning of the contract. Not only the
probability of an erroneous decision, but also the size, and thus cost, of the
error, is likely to vary with changes in x, y, and z. Expenditures on careful
drafting and on litigating will not avert all errors but will probably avert the
grossest ones, as measured by consequences. If the true damages suffered by
the victim of an alleged breach are $1 million, the standard deviation is likely
to be smaller the greater the investment in negotiating and drafting the
contract and in litigating the legal dispute over its meaning. This point may
help explain the "middle of the road" propensity of arbitrators. Because they
are not bound by the rules for interpreting contracts or subject to appellate
review (there are no appellate arbitrators and judicial review of arbitration
decisions is extremely limited), and therefore are operating with fewer
constraints than courts, there is a potential risk of a high degree of
unpredictability in arbitral decisions. That risk-the variance dimension, not
the probability-is reduced if arbitral awards are truncated. We can think of
this tendency as a substitute for judicial review ofjury verdicts.
Even with this truncation, arbitration would be unlikely to be a popular
method of resolving contract disputes if arbitrators were substantially more
error prone than courts. Its popularity implies substitutability between legal
rules and commercial knowledge. Judges in interpreting contracts are guided
by rules, arbitrators by their knowledge of the commercial context. Perhaps,
then, judges who know something about commercial matters make the fewest
errors in interpreting contracts. An interesting question to investigate
empirically is whether lawyer arbitrators tend to have relevant commercial
knowledge; if so, this would support the suggestion that a combination of
legal and commercial expertise is optimal for resolving a dispute over the
meaning of a contract.
The probability of litigation, p, is critical to an understanding of why it
is optimal for partiesHeinOnline
to allow
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Although p is a function of x, it is influenced by other factors as well, such as
the complexity of the contract, its duration, irreducible uncertainty, and
judicial unpredictability. It might seem that the lower p was, the lower
would be the expected cost of an adverse outcome to a lawsuit, and so the
smaller would be the expected benefit of eliminating the need for such a suit
by resolving the ambiguity in the contract itself. But this depends on why p
is lower. If it is simply because a dispute over the particular contract term is
unlikely (maybe the likelihood that the term will come into play during the
life of the contract is slight), there is no problem. But if p is lower because x
is higher, and the higher x has resulted in a reduction in z (the court is
investing less care in litigation because the parties are drafting their contracts
more carefully), then expected litigation costs, py, may rise. This seems
unlikely, however, since y will fall as x increases, so the net effect of a
simultaneous increase in x and decrease in z (which will cause an increase in
y-the less the court invests in dispute resolution the more the parties will) is
unlikely to be significant. In a commercial setting in which suits are rare,
maybe because the existence of ongoing relationships among contracting
parties both reduces the likelihood of disputes (the parties have a lot of
information) and facilitates informal settlement of those disputes that do
arise, we can expect contracts to be short, lack detail, and contain gaps and
ambiguities.68
When p is high, the parties may be led to reduce the duration of their
contract or defer providing for particular contingencies by "agreeing to
agree" to resolve those contingencies if and when they arise. 69 Alternatively,
because the longer the duration of a contract the likelier a contingency that
was not foreseen and provided for is to materialize and precipitate a legal
dispute, p will be greater the longer the term of the contract, which implies
an increase in x. 70 Thus we can expect "relational" contracts to be more
detailed and therefore longer than short-term contracts. But short-term
contracts that are "relational" in the distinct sense of being between parties
that engage in repeat transactions can be expected to be short, because the
parties will be constrained by the hope of future business to resolve
disagreements amicably; p will therefore be low, and there will be little
incentive to incur high x in order to minimize p.
Just as p may be exogenously high, so may y, litigation expense, which
might for example rise because of changes in procedural rules or because of
increases in the price of legal services. Such an increase would be expected
68. Other economic motives for leaving contracts vague, besides economizing on costs of
negotiation and drafting, are discussed in George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract
Tenns: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.CC. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065 (2002).
69. OLIVER HART & JOHN MOORE, AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: CONTRACTS THAT

RULE OUT BUT Do NOT RULE IN (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10397,
2004).
70. For some evidenceHeinOnline
of this relation,
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to cause an increase in x, in order to reduce p and thus offset some of the
increase iny.
Consider now the effect of an increase in z, that is, of a greater judicial
investment in interpreting contracts to fulfill the parties' expectations. The
parties will be less careful in negotiating and drafting their contracts, so x
will fall, resulting in a cost savings. At the same time, the probability of
litigation, and hence the expected costs of litigation, will rise. The effect will
be buffered, however, by the fact that an increase in z will reduce y, for
which z is a substitute. Even if the substitution is incomplete, so that z + y is
larger than before z was increased, this effect on litigation costs may be
offset by a reduction in error costs, since the more resources invested in a
lawsuit the less likely it is to be decided erroneously.
This analysis may seem to imply an aggressive role for the court as
contract interpreter because that would lower the cost of all contracts, by
reducing x, while probably increasing only slightly a litigation rate that is
likely to be quite low, and perhaps not increasing the cost per litigated case at
all. But this conclusion presupposes a competent and honest judiciary. The
more competent and honest it is (and competence may be inverse to the use
of lay juries), the less detail we can expect in contracts-an example of the
substitution of z for x. In this vein, John Langbein attributes the greater
brevity of European contracts as compared to American contracts largely to
the fact that contract cases in Europe are "decided by a trustworthy career
judiciary whose members have been selected and promoted on criteria of
ability, learning, and diligence. 71
Against this, however, is the concern one sometimes hears expressed by
European lawyers that European judges lack a feel for commercial issues,
and in particular for the importance of prompt judicial resolution of contract
cases, because they do not come from practice, as most American judges do.
In fact our contract judges are fairly aggressive, judging from the many
departures from literalism that I have discussed in this Article. Yet it does
seem that our contracts are longer than comparable European ones, and this
may support Langbein's thesis of the superiority of European to American
contract adjudication. It may suggest that specialization and professionalism
beat worldliness when it comes to interpreting commercial contracts. I say
"may" not "does" because an alternative interpretation of the brevity of
European contracts is that the European civil codes contain so many default
terms that most contracts consist largely of terms incorporated by reference
to code terms. If so, that brevity may actually be a symptom of distrust of
judges' ability to handle contract cases on their own.
In contrasting commercially savvy American judges, comfortable with
pragmatic interpretation (or a pragmatic inflection of the four corners rule),
with cloistered, commercially innocent European judges, condemned to
71. Langbein, supra noteHeinOnline
23, at 386. -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 1611 2004-2005
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formalism, I am not only exaggerating for the sake of clarity; I am also
concealing a troublesome trend in the American judiciary. Because judicial
salaries have fallen relative to salaries of partners in law firms, fewer and
fewer American judges have a substantial background in the practice of
commercial law. Some do. Others have a background in economic analysis
of law, and the isomorphism between economic analysis and commercial
thinking may help these judges understand commercial transactions.72 But
clearly we now have a mixed system consisting of judges who have a
sufficient comfort level with the commercial world to engage in pragmatic
contract interpretation and judges who do not and who are therefore likely to
take a more formalist approach to interpreting contracts. Lawyers drafting
contracts will rarely know which type of judge they will encounter in the
event that a legal dispute arises over the meaning of the contract. This
uncertainty will increase x.
While it seems highly likely that an increase in z will lead to a reduction
in y (this is apparent from the fact that in the European legal systems the ratio
of judges to lawyers is much higher than it is in Anglo-American legal
systems), it is less clear that an increase in y will lead to a reduction in z. If
the lawyers invest more effort in litigation, this may serve to clarify the
issues but it may also multiply them and increase the number of witnesses
and the amount of documentary evidence and lengthen the litigation; these
things may increase the workload of judges. That is, y and z are likely to be
complements as well as substitutes in systems such as that of the United
States in which the control of the pace and scope of litigation is largely in the
hands of the parties rather than the judges. It is unclear which effect
predominates in such a system. Increases in party litigation expenditures
may thus increase the costs of resolving contract disputes indirectly by their
effect on judicial effort, as well as directly. But there should be at least some
offset as a consequence of the tendency of greater expenditures on litigation
to reduce expected error costs.
A factor that influences several of the variables in the model is the
dollar value of the transaction. 73 The greater that value, the likelier litigation
is 74 and also the greater are the litigation expenditures that the parties are
likely to make. Those expenditures will tend to reduce the expected error
costs of the litigation. But probably on balance the total expected litigation
costs will be higher, and this will increase the optimal expenditure of the
parties on negotiation and drafting, resulting in longer, more carefully drafted
contracts. As a result, large contractual transactions may be no more likely
to be litigated than small ones. This is a counterintuitive implication of the
analysis.
72. 1realize this is self-serving testimony that is not even given under oath!
73. See the brief discussion in Battigalli & Maggi, supra note 1, at 808-09.
74. This is a general implication of economic models of litigation. POSNER, supra note 7, at
569.
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The equilibrium state is unclear because of the mutual dependence of
the variables and the difficulty of predicting expected litigation costs.
Imagine, however, the following simplified sequence. The parties to the
contract negotiation, having, let us say, only a vague impression of what
either z (the judicial investment in resolving contract disputes) or e (the cost
of an erroneous judicial decision) is, nevertheless have to pick an x if there is
to be a contract. That pick will influence both p (the probability of an
interpretive dispute that will give rise to litigation) and y (the parties'
litigation expenditures, should a legal dispute arise). Assume z is known.
With x, y, and z known, and p at least "guessable" because it is a function of
x ("guessable" rather than determinable because, as noted earlier, it is
influenced by exogenous factors rather than just by x), the parties should be
able to make a rough estimate of their total expected litigation costs. That
estimate may in turn cause the parties to adjust their initial choice of x,
setting off a new round of estimates and adjustments. Because of the
complexity of the calculations, and profound uncertainty, we can expect a
wide dispersion of x across contracts. That complexity and uncertainty may
explain, moreover, why many contract lawyers seem to give little thought to
the possibility of litigation, and why in practice x may usually be a simple,
positive function of the value of the contract.
The initial choice of x, with the other variables taken as fixed, can be
modeled as follows. I rewrite equation (1) as
C = ax + p(x)[y + z + e(x, y, z)],

(2)

where x is units of care in negotiation and drafting and a is the cost per unit,
and the other variables are as before. To determine the choice of x that will
minimize C, I take the derivative of C with respect to x, yielding (with
rearrangement of terms)
dC/dx = a + dp/dx[y + z + e(x, y, z)] + p(x)5e/&,

(3)

which when set equal to zero yields (provided that the rate at which a change
in x causes a change in C is increasing 75) a minimum at
a = - dp/dx~y + z + e(x, y, z)] -p(x)e/&.

(4)

75. Think of a graph with C on the vertical axis and x on the horizontal axis, the relation
between them thus being describable by a curve. If the extreme point on the curve (the point at
which the derivative of C with respect to x is zero, that is, a flat line) is a maximum, that is, the top
of the curve, the rate at which C is changing with changes in x must be decreasing (i.e. the second
derivative of C with respect to x is negative). Conversely, if the rate is increasing (i.e. the second
derivative is positive), it means we're approaching the bottom of a curve, that is, a minimum point.
For the cost function described here, this rate is always increasing in x, and therefore equation (4)
costs.1613 2004-2005
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Because dp/dx and &/& are negative, the right-hand side of equation (4) is
positive. Equation (4) says that parties will increase their care in negotiation
and drafting until the effect on the expected costs of litigation (both the direct
effect and the indirect effect because of the effect of increased care on error
costs should there be a lawsuit) is just equal to the cost (a) of the last unit of
X.
Let me end by noting an oversimplification that slants the analysis a bit
too much toward an aggressive judicial role in contract interpretation. I have
assumed that costs-transaction costs in a broad sense-are incurred at only
two stages: the negotiation and drafting of the contract, and the legal dispute
that propels the interpretive issue into court or arbitration. Actually there is
an intermediate stage. When a dispute over the contract's meaning arises,
the parties will first try to resolve it themselves. They will do this not only
because of the costs of litigation, but also because of the reputation factor
that I discussed earlier: the party demonstrably in the wrong on the
interpretive issue will hesitate to force the issue to litigation; he is likely to
lose and in any event may acquire a reputation as someone who does not
honor his commitments. The more carefully drafted the contract is, the
easier it will be for the parties to resolve a dispute over its meaning when the
dispute first arises, in other words at the prelitigation stage.
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